Publications

Emilia Margoni (forthcoming). ‘Which quantum foundations for the minimalist ontology framework?’ Philosophical Studies.
Michael Esfeld’s minimalist ontology is committed to two axioms relating to (1) distance relations that identify simple objects (permanent matter points) while (2) the distances between them change. This article scrutinizes such a conceptual strategy to determine whether it can successfully be applied to all levels of physical reality, as Esfeld contends. To do so, it explores one of his paradigmatic sources, that is, Bohmian mechanics. Two arguments are proposed. First, while Bohm’s original formulation of Bohmian mechanics and the interpretation advocated by Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghì are typically taken as mathematically equivalent, this article argues that Esfeld’s minimalist ontology does not cover the former’s ontological richness. To secure its achievement, the minimalist ontology framework needs to i) break the equivalence between the two versions via a commitment to the nomological interpretation of the wavefunction ii) yet attribute some kind of physical efficacy to the wavefunction as a guiding parameter for the evolution of particles living in three-dimensional space. Both requirements will be critically addressed. Second, the article shows that Esfeld’s metaphysical program is not only forced to rely on a theoretically suspicious formulation of quantum mechanics, but that more fundamental, under-development approaches in theoretical physics are way less reconcilable with its axioms, thus questioning its alleged universality.

Emilia Margoni (forthcoming). ‘Which space for spacetime functionalism in the quantum-to-classical transition?’ In Raoni Arroyo & Matteo Morganti (eds.), Quantum Dilemmas: Philosophical Issues in Quantum Theory after One Century, Springer.
After one century since the first formulation of quantum mechanics, many details remain to be untangled. Notwithstanding its spectacular success, there is still much left to understand about its proper interpretation. After all these decades of prosperous applications and conceptual quandaries, whose anchorage was posed in the scientifically glorious years between the two world wars, a legitimate interrogation concerns whether to rethink the foundations of quantum mechanics and how to potentially navigate this scope. The general expectation is that this enterprise can fully be achieved only in conjunction with a parallel programme on relativistic physics. More specifically, a central challenge of 21st-century physics involves how to develop a framework capable of integrating quantum and gravitational physics, potentially leading to a theory of quantum gravity. Nowadays, several approaches have been developed, such as string theory, loop quantum gravity, and causal set theory. Within the context of this endeavor, an increasingly popular perspective is the so-called emergent gravity paradigm, in which low-energy spatiotemporal phenomena, as described by general relativity, are conceived as emergent from an underlying, arguably non-spatiotemporal background. In the philosophical discussion on the topic, a recent proposal is that spacetime functionalism – here understood as the position that presents spacetime as functionally realised by a more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal set of entities – is the proper way to deal with the recovery of spacetime. In the present context, I will discuss the usefulness of such a conceptual programme, with a particular focus on the quantum-to-classical transition a theory of quantum gravity is expected to tackle. This transition opens crucial routes that invite further scrutiny on, and present novel challenges to, the foundations of quantum mechanics.

Baptiste Le Bihan (forthcoming). ‘What Can Spacetime Emergence Teach Us About Consciousness?‘ , Journal of Consciousness Studies.
Schneider and Bailey’s Superpsychism advances the Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics, on which entanglement unfolds in a non-spatiotemporal arena. By locating maximal consciousness at this fundamental level, they aim to gain leverage over both physicalism and cosmopsychism. I argue, however, that the view encounters two issues. First, if the fundamental level is non-spatiotemporal, our conception of the physical becomes unstable. At best one could redescribe what remains as a thin negative gap, but even that residual puzzle carries little dialectical force, reflecting ignorance rather than any principled contrast. Second, the contrast between superpsychism and cosmopsychism cannot rely on scale once spacetime is set aside; recast mereologically, it shows no clear advantage for superpsychism, and in fact risks collapsing into cosmopsychism unless further argument is supplied. The broader lesson is that the Prototime framework points more generally, and at least prima facie, toward non-spatiotemporal monism, while leaving open the task of showing whether and why superpsychism should be preferred within the family of monist views.

Baptiste Le Bihan (forthcoming). ‘Why Repetition Can Only Give You Eternity, Not Immortality‘ , Think.
Could endless repetition make us immortal? Nietzsche toyed with the idea, and some cosmological speculations revive it. The Poincaré recurrence theorem shows how such repetitions might arise in a finite, deterministic cosmos. Yet if two cosmic states are exactly alike, Leibniz tells us they are not two but one. Repetition then collapses into identity, creating a cosmic temporal loop. Eternal return could give us eternity, but not immortality.

Nicola Bamonti, Enrico Cinti and Marco Sanchioni (forthcoming). ‘Non-Relativistic Background Independence and the Gauging of Spacetime Symmetries‘ , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
This article redefines background independence through a gauge-theoretic lens, arguing that it is not exclusive to general relativity but inherent to any gravitational theory whose spacetime geometry emerges dynamically from gauging symmetry groups’ algebras. Applying this framework, we demonstrate that (torsional) Newton-Cartan and Carrollian gravities—obtained via gauging the Bargmann and Carroll algebras, respectively—satisfy background independence. This shows that background independence is decoupled from relativistic structures (for example, Lorentzian metrics, light cones) and instead is a hallmark of gauging: spacetime geometry arises as an interacting dynamical gauge field. We also suggest that this new way of thinking about background independence might have relevant implications for quantum gravity theory building.

Nicola Bamonti, Enrico Cinti and Marco Sanchioni (forthcoming). ‘Quo Vadis Wheeler–DeWitt Time?: Challenging Emergent Time in Quantum Cosmology‘ , Philosophy of Science.
This paper challenges the notion of emergent time in quantum cosmology by examining the reconciliation of the timeless Wheeler–DeWitt equation with the Universe’s dynamical evolution. We critically evaluate the analogy between the Wheeler–DeWitt and Klein–Gordon equations, highlighting challenges for the identification of an emergent time parameter. We conclude that refining this analogy may lead to a better understanding of emergent time in quantum cosmology, though it is still not free from complications.

Baptiste Le Bihan (forthcoming). ‘Holistic Versus Fragmented Multiverses: Empirical Access via Causal and Grounding Signatures.’
Can multiverse hypotheses ever receive empirical support? Critics argue that multiverse scenarios posit unobservable entities, face severe underdetermination, or fall outside the bounds of science. This chapter challenges that view by offering a naturalistic metaphysical counterpoint to Bayesian approaches, distinguishing fragmented from holistic multiverses. Scientific proposals are almost always holistic: they embed universes within a unifying physical or metaphysical structure that can, in principle, leave empirical signatures inside the universes. I develop a typology of such signatures and show how it applies to leading scenarios from quantum theory, cosmology, and string theory. This framework clarifies why objections such as the ‘this universe’ objection and a newly articulated generalization, the epistemic isolation objection, fail against scientifically motivated multiverses. The upshot is a qualified defence: while fragmented multiverses remain empirically inaccessible, certain holistic multiverses could, in principle, be supported by the same epistemic
standards used elsewhere in physics.

Emilia Margoni and Daniele Oriti (forthcoming). ‘The Emergence of Spacetime: What Role for Functionalism?‘, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Among the various attempts to formulate a theory of quantum gravity, one class of approaches suggests that spacetime, as modelled by general relativity, is destined to fade away. A major issue then becomes identifying which structures may inhabit the more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal environment, as well as explaining their relationship with the higher-level spatiotemporal physics. Recently, it has been suggested that a certain understanding of functionalism is the proper framework to suitably account for the recovery of spacetime. In this article, the viability and usefulness of such a conceptual strategy is explored, by looking at the various levels of spacetime emergence a theory of quantum gravity is expected to deal with. Our conclusion is that while the applicability of spacetime functionalism is also available in a quantum gravity context, its import remains rather unsettled.

Daniel Grimmer, Enrico Cinti and Rasmus Jaksland (forthcoming). ‘Duality, Underdetermination, and the Uncommon Common Core‘, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Dualities arise when two seemingly different descriptions of the world are physically equivalent, suggesting that either description can be used to describe a given system. This raises the question of which description, if any, is true and raises worries of empirical underdetermination. This paper explores the underdetermination problem in the context of dualities and focuses on the viability of a common core ontology as a solution. The common core suggests that one should only ontologically commit to what is invariant under the duality map between the dual descriptions. The paper examines this solution through the lens of Fourrier duality in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and raises concerns about the existence and adequacy of the common core. It argues that the common core might not be ontologically rich enough to support a genuine realist commitment and questions whether it should be preferred over the dual descriptions. By doing so, the analysis highlights the challenges of employing the common core interpretation in quantum mechanics and also in other dualities such as T-duality and AdS/CFT, especially for purposes of breaking underdetermination. Dualities are, we conclude, likely examples of underdetermination and therefore a challenge to scientific realism.

Enrico Cinti, Sebastian De Haro, Mark S. Golden, Umut Gürsoy and Henk T. C. Stoof (2026). ‘Holographic Strange Metals for Philosophers and Physicists‘, Foundations of Physics 56:8.
This paper introduces the physics and philosophy of strange metals, which are characterized by unusual electrical and thermal properties that deviate from conventional metallic behaviour. The anomalous strange-metal behaviour discussed here appears in the normal state of a copper-oxide high-temperature superconductor, and it cannot be described using standard condensed-matter physics. Currently, it can only be described through a holographic dual, viz. a four-dimensional black hole in anti-de Sitter spacetime. This paper first introduces the theory of, and specific experiments
carried out on, strange metals. Then it discusses a number of philosophical questions that strange metals open up regarding the experimental evidence for holography and its realist interpretation. Strange metals invert the explanatory arrows, in that usual holographic arguments are seen as giving explanations of the bulk quantum-gravity theory from the boundary. By contrast, the aim here is, by using holography, to explain the experimentally discovered and anomalous properties of strange metals.

Emilia Margoni (2025). ‘Processualism ahead of time: Bohm’s understanding of physics‘. In Andrea Oldofredi (ed.), Guiding Waves in Quantum mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Processualism is a view that is becoming increasingly popular within a variety of disciplines and research areas. It entails the idea that concrete, definite objects derive their identity from underlying, more fundamental entities, namely processes. This perspective, which is generally couched in terms of the relation between objects without temporal parts and processes with temporal parts, becomes rather controversial in the context of relativistic physics, which rebuts the idea of a linear parameter that can be uniquely defined. In this chapter, I will first discuss to what extent David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics accords with processualism. Then, I will explore whether his understanding of the theory of special relativity can be couched in processual terms, while incorporating the lesson of Einstein’s theory. I will conclude by outlining that not only does Bohm’s reading of physics resonates with, but it also provides novel strength to, process thinking.

Ali Barzegar, Emilia Margoni and Daniele Oriti (2025). ‘A minimalist account of agency in physics‘. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.
We adopt an approach to agency aimed at developing a minimalist, scalable and naturalized account of it. After providing a general definition, we explore possible extensions and refinements, domain of applicability, as well as a comparison with other recent accounts, finally tackling potential objections. With respect to what we classify as strong (such as Tononi’s) and weak (such as Rovelli’s) characterizations, our notion of agency situates itself in a middle position — our intent being precisely that of spelling out the advantages of this median account within a variety of contexts, such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the debate on the nature of physical laws and bayesianism.

Baptiste Le Bihan, Emilia Margoni and Annica Vieser (2025). ‘Possibility in Physics‘. In Hervé Zwirn (ed.), Quantum Physics and Cosmology: The Mysteries of the Infinitely Small and the Infinitely Large, Iste. pp. 303-322.
Physics not only describes past, present, and future events but also accounts for unrealized possibilities. These possibilities are represented through the solution spaces given by theories. These spaces are typically classified into two categories: kinematical and dynamical. The distinction raises important questions about the nature of physical possibility. How should we interpret the difference between kinematical and dynamical models? Do dynamical solutions represent genuine possibilities in the physical world? Should kinematical possibilities be viewed as mere logical or linguistic constructs, devoid of a deeper connection to the structure of physical reality? This chapter addresses these questions by analyzing some of the most significant theories in physics: classical mechanics, general relativity and quantum mechanics, with a final mention to quantum gravity. We argue that only dynamical models correspond to genuine physical possibilities.

Sam Baron and Baptiste Le Bihan (2025). ‘Causal Set Theory is (Strongly) Causal’, Foundations of Physics 55 (63).
Causal Set Theory (CST) is a promising approach to fundamental physics that seems to treat causation as a basic posit. But in exactly what sense is CST causal? We argue that if the growth dynamics is interpreted as a physical process, then CST employs relations of actual causation between causal set elements, whereby elements bring one another into existence. This is important, as it provides a better sense of how CST works, highlights important differences from general relativity—where relations between spacetime points are typically seen as cases of mere causal connectibility rather than actual causation of the relevant type—and points toward a specific understanding of the emergence of spacetime within CST

Sam Baron, Baptiste Le Bihan and James Read (2025). ‘Scientific Theory and Possibility’, Erkenntnis.
It is plausible that the models of scientific theories correspond to possibilities. But how do we know which models of which scientific theories so correspond? This paper provides a novel proposal for guiding belief about possibilities via scientific theories. The proposal draws on the notion of an effective theory: a theory that applies very well to a particular, restricted domain. We argue that it is the models of effective theories that we should believe correspond, at least in part, to possibilities. It is thus effective theories that should guide modal reasoning in science.

Enrico Cinti and Marco Sanchioni (2025). ‘Bridging supersymmetry and the spin-statistics theorem: a quest for emergence’, Synthese 205 (3): 1-22.
The coexistence of Supersymmetry (SUSY) and the Spin-Statistics Theorem (SST) poses a challenge, given their seeming incompatibility. While SUSY connects particles with distinct spins, SST links particle’s spin to their statistics. We propose a solution to this puzzle: both spin and SST may emerge as low-energy phenomena. To do so, we look at SUSY breaking at lower energy scales, exploring if this mechanism aligns with the concept of emergence. The paper presents a comprehensive review of the SUSY-SST tension, a philosophical introduction to SUSY-breakig, and an argument for spin and SST emergence within SUSY. Overall, our aim is to show how SUSY and SST can coexist in the same theory and thus deepen our understanding of SUSY quantum field theory.

Enrico Cinti, Cristian Mariani and Marco Sanchioni (2025). ‘The Unbearable Indefiniteness of Spacetime’, Foundations of Physics 55 (1): 1-25.
The coexistence of Supersymmetry (SUSY) and the Spin-Statistics Theorem (SST) poses a challenge, given their seeming incompatibility. While SUSY connects particles with distinct spins, SST links particle’s spin to their statistics. We propose a solution to this puzzle: both spin and SST may emerge as low-energy phenomena. To do so, we look at SUSY breaking at lower energy scales, exploring if this mechanism aligns with the concept of emergence. The paper presents a comprehensive review of the SUSY-SST tension, a philosophical introduction to SUSY-breakig, and an argument for spin and SST emergence within SUSY. Overall, our aim is to show how SUSY and SST can coexist in the same theory and thus deepen our understanding of SUSY quantum field theory.

Baptiste Le Bihan (2024). ‘The Great Loop: From Conformal Cyclic Cosmology to Aeon Monism’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Penrose’s conformal cyclic cosmology describes the cosmos as a collection of successive universes, the so-called aeons. The beginning and ending of our universe are directly connected to two other, anterior and posterior, universes. Penrose considers but rules out a different interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology: that the beginning of our universe is connected to its own end in a cosmic loop. The paper argues that the view, aeon monism, should be regarded as a natural interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology and discusses its implications for the concept of eternal return in light of the most popular metaphysics of time.

Sam Baron and Baptiste Le Bihan (2024). ‘Causal Theories of Spacetime’, Noûs 58 (1): 202–224. 
We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.

Emilia Margoni (2024). ‘Adynamism in Physics: The Block Universe vs Barbour’s Relational Strategy’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
The block universe is generally considered as the metaphysical position that best accommodates the outcomes of relativistic physics. Its most consistent formulation postulates a static universe where change is not admitted. However, some of its advocates try to reconcile its basic adynamical commitments as to the nature of physical reality with certain aspects of dynamism that arise, for instance, within human experience. In this article, I first examine how some block viewers try to reconcile dynamism and adynamism. I then go on to discuss the problems that emerge while trying to make room for dynamism within the block. To this end, I clarify the meaning of adynamism and explains what it takes to eradicate dynamism through the implementation of the so-called “Langrangian schema”. Based on this analysis, I juxtapose two resolute attempts at the formulation of a thoroughly adynamical project. The first, named relational block world, aims to make the block view totally static. The second, Barbour’s early works on the implementation of a neo-Machian relational strategy, makes the point that a complete adynamism cannot be achieved within relativity and its metaphysical counterpart. The article in conclusion argues that, by dismissing four-dimensionalism and embracing three-dimensionalism, Barbour proves better at promoting an utterly static physics.